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I. INTRODUCTION
Political theorists are much indebted to Joseph Carens for his 1987 article “Aliens and 
Citizens: the Case for Open Borders”. Written in a period of increased restrictions on 
migration, Carens’ article was pioneering in two ways: it introduced the migration ques-
tion to political theory’s agenda and set the terms of the debate from the free movement 
side. Carens’ recent book, The Ethics of Immigration, takes a different strategy. It aims 
explicitly to engage with the Conventional View of immigration and shows that even a 
closed-borders view can accommodate some measures that improve citizenship and 
admission policies. The open-borders argument is not abandoned, but is left to the end 
of the book. Carens’ main concern, however, is to show that the open-borders argument 
does not conflict with the measures he proposes.
It is possible to have the opposite concern: are the proposed measures a way to 
advance towards a world of open borders? My analysis here will be limited to the first 
measure proposed in the book, namely that “[…] justice requires that democratic states 
grant citizenship at birth to the descendants of settled immigrants” (20). Whether justice 
requires this or not, many ‘democratic states’ already conform to this principle and my 
argument is not that they should stop. Rather, my worry is that an argumentative strat-
egy aiming to extend birthright citizenship is not a way to advance towards an open-
borders world.
To give a brief overview of my position, an analogy may help. Imagine that we live 
in the United States during the times of racial segregation. Homer Plessy, who is of 
seven-eighths Caucasian descent and one-eighth African descent, has just sat down in a 
‘whites-only’ streetcar. To do this is legally forbidden. We have two argumentative 
options. One is to go to the Supreme Court and argue against the Segregation Act. The 
other is to go to Congress and argue that the law should be changed so that people like 
Plessy can travel in whites-only streetcars on the grounds that, after all, they are ‘white’. 
We do not know how convincing our arguments will be and given the political context, 
we may lose in both cases. But is a change of law a step towards the abolition of racial 
segregation?
My view is that by advocating some ‘true criterion of whiteness’ we reinforce the 
power of those who believe that racial distinctions are relevant. In the same way, by advo-
cating some ‘fair criteria’ about who ‘deserves’ to be citizen we strengthen the view that 
national distinctions are important. Such argumentative strategies are likely to move us 
away from, rather than get us closer to, the abolition of racial and national segregation. 
This contribution is a threefold critique of the idea that “[…] justice requires that 
democratic states grant citizenship at birth to the descendants of settled immigrants”. 
Firstly, I argue that by making ‘justice’ dependent on states and their attributes  (birthright 
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citizenship), this idea strengthens methodological nationalism. Secondly, I analyze its 
justification and argue that grounding (citizenship) rights on the existence of social con-
nections is logically and morally problematic. Thirdly, I analyze its scope (granting rights 
to the descendants of the ‘settled’) and its method of implementation (granting citizen-
ship rights automatically ‘at birth’). While from a less sedentarist perspective, no one can 
be considered ‘settled’ in advance, I will express some doubts that granting citizenship 
rights is always automatically a way to extend people’s rights. All in all, I argue that by 
its justification, scope and method of implementation, this idea moves us away from, 
rather than gets us closer to, an open-borders world.
II. DOES JUSTICE REQUIRE METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM?
Carens argues that “justice requires that democratic states grant citizenship at birth to 
the descendants of settled immigrants”. Let us compare it with the view that “justice 
requires us to extend the criterion of whiteness”. While it is easier to see that it presumes 
racial distinctions, it is less obvious how extending citizenship rights assumes what social 
scientists call ‘methodological nationalism’. 
‘Methodological nationalism’ is the view that “[…] humanity is naturally divided 
into a limited number of nations, which organize themselves internally as nation-states 
and externally set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states” (Beck 
and Sznaider 2010, 383). In the 1970s, sociologists were the first to realize that regard-
less of their theoretical orientation, their work was tarnished by this assumption (Martins 
1974, 276). When they talked about ‘society’, they equated it with the society of the 
nation-state and either referred to a particular national object (e.g. ‘French society’) or 
had in mind a more general concept of a society that was necessarily bounded. In both 
cases, they took for granted a category imposed by the some particular actors (i.e. 
nation-states). 
There are two problems with methodological nationalism. The first is that it is false 
and it biases our understanding of social phenomena. This is an important bias for on 
the one hand, “[…] society has never been the isolated, the ‘internally developing’ sys-
tem which has normally been implied in social theory” (Giddens 1973, 265), and one 
the other, society may not even be a system, closed or open, at all. Some sociologists 
insisted that “[…] we can never find a single bounded society in geographical or social 
space” and urged that we study societies as “[…] multiple overlapping and intersecting 
sociospatial networks of power” (Mann 1986, 1ff.). If we change the paradigm, we view 
states as only one of the major types of power networks.
The second problem of methodological nationalism is that it transforms social 
sciences and ethics into a discourse that legitimizes particular actors. As states define 
themselves as political organizations needing a bounded territory and a delimited set of 
people, their view about the human world is taken for granted by most researchers. They 
endorse one or more of the following three assumptions: (i) state-centrism, the idea that 
the state is the only or the most accomplished form of political organization; (ii) groupism, 
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the assumption that people who live within the borders of a state represent a homoge-
neous group, endowed with collective intentions, projects, cultures, values etc. (Brubaker 
2002); and (iii) territorialism, the idea that the spatial dimensions of human actions and 
of social phenomena should be analyzed according to the divisions imposed by the states 
(Sholte 2002). While the three assumptions are logically independent, they are often 
endorsed together (Dumitru 2014).
Carens’ proposal according to which “justice requires that democratic states grant 
citizenship at birth to the descendants of settled immigrants” is based on the above three 
methodologically nationalist premises. It is state-centred by assuming that what ‘justice’ 
requires is dependent on the states’ actions; it is groupist, by assuming that people 
labelled as citizens by a state are connected to each other from birth and ‘belong’ to that 
group. It is territorialist, by using the states’ categories to analyze human mobility: per-
manent residents are distinguished from temporary workers and visitors, they can be 
settled, temporary authorized or unauthorized, they can come as family members, work-
ers or refugees.
Is there an alternative to methodological nationalism? My suggestion is that one can 
come up with multiple alternatives just by looking at the above assumptions as descriptive 
statements. Does our social life have the shape of a bounded group or of a network, in 
which people connected to us have connections with people we are not connected to? 
Can there be social connections between millions, sometimes billions, of people labelled 
as citizens (except in an imagined community)? Are our decisions to change residence ever 
motivated by a single, exclusive reason (either family or work) as administrations assume? 
In real life, do we ever know whether we move permanently or just for a while? Unfortu-
nately, there is no space to develop these points here, but the methodological nationalist’s 
view about society and mobility would seem to be inaccurate. 
III. THE ARGUMENT FROM SOCIAL CONNECTIONS
Carens argues that citizenship should be granted on the basis of de facto ‘belonging’ to 
the ‘political community’. Such a proposal has been defended by Hammar (1990), among 
others, and more recently by Shachar (2009) who argued in favour of a jus nexi. The idea 
is that those who de facto reside in a country should be recognized as members of the 
‘political community’ and granted citizenship. It is easy to see how the argument is based 
on methodological nationalist premises: residence in a territory bounded by a state is 
assumed to entail social connections with all the people living within a territory. The 
argument’s aim is to extend people’s rights, but its ground is shaky. Its strategy is to 
infer from a descriptive premise (de facto social connections) a normative conclusion 
reframed in national terms (‘political community’, ‘citizenship’). Both the premise and 
the inference are questionable.
Firstly, the premise looks like a descriptive statement, asserting the existence of 
social connections, but its imagined character appears clearly in the case of newborns. 
Carens suggests that when born, a baby “enters a social world” and “she is connected 
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to people”, while recognizing that this is “[...] most intimately to parents and siblings, 
and through them to friends and more distant family members” (23). It is difficult to 
affirm, however, that newborns have a social life in the sense the adults have one. New-
borns cannot make associations or be in conflict with other people; they do not have 
friends, cannot help anyone in difficult situations or invite them to dinner. Their ‘social 
membership’ is at most a form of ‘belonging’ not of ‘membership’. By contrast, children 
have a rich social life and their social connections are important in number and in types. 
Yet, it is newborns, not children, who are assumed to be members of a political com-
munity. Is it not strange to have to argue that newborns are members of political com-
munity merely to account for the custom of granting citizenship at birth?
Secondly, the inference from ‘social connections’ to ‘political community’ appears to 
be even more bizarre in the case of newborns. Not because newborns cannot vote or pay 
taxes, but rather because it is difficult to see how their ‘social world’, populated with as 
many parents and siblings as you wish, can be equated with the ‘political community’. 
Likewise, although young children have a rich social life – some richer than ours – it is 
difficult to see how their ‘social connections’ can be translated into ‘political membership’.
Let us take an example to clarify this point. Imagine that your child innocently plays 
Lego with mine every day: they develop stable and harmonious social connections, but 
are they also becoming members of some political community? Of course, our children 
are part of the ‘Lego community’, but only in a metaphorical sense. We would be sur-
prised if one day, the Lego Group sends us a certificate of membership and some of us 
would squarely refuse to ‘belong’ to Lego. Yet, we find normal to translate concrete 
social life into political membership and none of us reject the idea that our babies belong 
by birth to some nation-state.
Historians of the nation-states demonstrated that they acted in a sense just like a 
powerful Lego Group in my example. Mann (1993), for instance, showed how in the 
nation-state building process, states succeeded in ‘caging’ social activities and people 
within themselves; Torpey (2000) described how states grasped or ‘embraced’ the pop-
ulation that happened to live in a territory – by censuses, birth registration and an 
increasing bureaucracy. In his book, The Invention of the Passport, Torpey analyzed the 
process by which governments also came to monopolize the legitimate means of move-
ment: birth certificates, identity cards and passports became the mobile version of the 
administrative files through which the states kept their power over people.
One might think that we now live in a world of nation-states and that even if we 
were to assume that, by some kind of magic, our children’s birth and social connections 
would transform themselves into political membership, it would still be in children’s 
best interest to maintain this assumption. Nation-states give children protection, rights 
and opportunities. Citizenship is what gives our children rights to better schools and 
playgrounds and protection from being expelled when they play Lego together. 
Carens’ argument aims to extend children’ rights, but isn’t citizenship the problem 
rather than the solution? If we are concerned by the children’s best interests, can we 
accept that, by birth, some children have rights that others do not? Is the children’s best 
interest to be assigned, at birth, to one national category?
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IV. CITIZENSHIP AND SEDENTARISM
Carens argues that descendants of settled immigrants should be granted citizenship at 
birth automatically. In a world as it is, where rights are granted by nation-states, this 
principle appears to be a clear extension of rights both in scope (immigrants’ children 
are given citizenship rights) and in procedure (citizenship is granted without application). 
Our methodological nationalism prevents us from seeing the blind spot in this principle. 
I would argue that conceiving of this principle as limited to ‘settled’ immigrants and as 
an ‘automatic’ grant of citizenship raises some problems.
Methodological nationalism views people as settled by default. Elsewhere, I have 
called ‘sedentarism’ the assumption that it is normal or preferable to stay rather than to 
go (Dumitru 2012). Sedentarism is a bias that implicitly dominates the social sciences 
(they most often explain, analyze and classify mobility, not sedentary conduct), but is 
overtly defended in political philosophy (dominated by ‘normative’ accounts). In politi-
cal philosophy, spatial mobility is not an object of conceptual analysis. While philoso-
phers sometimes mention that (internal) free movement is a primary good (Rawls 1993), 
a basic right (Shue 1980), or a central human capability (Nussbaum 2000; Robeyns 2003; 
Kronlid 2008), too few books in political philosophy are dedicated to analyzing what 
freedom of movement is and what is it good for (for an exception, see Cole 2000). 
International mobility is always distinguished from internal mobility and analyzed as a 
kind of huge jump from one national container to another, a short and exceptional event 
in an otherwise sedentary life.
However, if we did not assume that social connections project us, by magic, into 
a community, we might pay more attention to how social connections are actually 
created. Spatial movement is a necessary condition for meeting people, and meeting 
people several times (that is, repeated movement) is a necessary condition for estab-
lishing durable social connections. Movement is intrinsic to our lives and, indeed, no 
action can be undertaken without moving. While social justice studies have developed 
remarkably in recent decades, no philosophical study has been devoted to inequalities 
of mobility. Privileged people spend their lives moving back and forth, coming and 
going, on longer and shorter journeys, for longer and shorter periods of time. The 
possibility to move depends on wealth, infrastructures, health condition, gender etc. 
But it also depends on states that erect barriers to people’s movement. Therefore, a 
theory of justice dealing with inequalities in mobility cannot grant states the traditional 
role of distributive agents.
The first blind spot of Carens’ principle is to assume people as settled. The concept 
of settlement is often taken as unproblematic and is rarely discussed in the literature. 
But who are the ‘settled’ immigrants whose children should be eligible for citizenship 
rights? In the 1793 French Constitutional Act, one year of residence was enough for a 
foreigner to acquire citizenship and in many states nowadays five years of residence is 
the legal requirement (of course, as naturalization cannot be claimed as a right, many 
long term residents die without acquiring citizenship). How many years are enough to 
be qualified as ‘settled’? Should declarative statements (about intentions to settle) count? 
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What if we visit another country and change our minds? A non-sedentarist approach 
would avoid granting rights on the basis of settlement.
The second blind spot is that citizenship should be granted automatically at birth. 
Nowadays, to methodological nationalists who see people as settled, automatic citizen-
ship appears as an obvious precious good. There are two reasons to doubt this good. 
First, in the 19th century France, descendants of foreigners did not see it in this way: 
they did not apply for citizenship. In response to xenophobic public opinion, the gov-
ernment established the jus soli, the automatic citizenship at birth, with the aim not to 
empower descendants of settled immigrants, but to enable the state to conscript them 
(Brubaker 1992). The second reason is that in a world in which people move and nation-
states view themselves as entitled to decide to exclude foreigners from citizenship and 
other rights, such an automatism creates problems. Numerous states do not recognize 
dual citizenship or recognize it only for some countries. Sometimes, for children who 
have been granted citizenship by jus soli in another country, a divestiture procedure is 
available at the age of majority and they can choose a single citizenship. But sometimes, 
they can simply lose their parent’s citizenship. If people renounce a country’s citizenship, 
they are sometimes obliged to apply for a visa to visit their parents’ country, and when 
accepted, to spend a limited time with their siblings and friends, to renounce inheritance, 
to be excluded from jobs and ownership rights, sometimes to pay a different price for 
the market goods. Those rights and rights denials vary considerably from country to 
country and depend on their agreements. But differential treatment of foreigners and 
citizens is thought to be a sovereign right of states.
Faced with these practical problems, what is the solution? Should people be ‘set-
tled’ and give their allegiance to a single country to have their human rights recognized? 
Or should human rights tout court be automatically protected without calling them citi-
zenship? I suppose that the second solution is what justice requires. 
To conclude, I would like to come back to my initial example of racial segregation. 
If we are happy that racial segregation came to an end, we will have difficulty in accept-
ing that Homer Plessy should have been the only person to obtain the right to travel in 
a whites-only streetcar. Homer Plessy’s appearance was ‘white’ and this is why he was 
chosen by the activists to defy the segregation law. They did not succeed, but their 
intention was not to obtain rights only for those whose appearance was ‘white’. Analo-
gously, immigrants who are indistinguishable from natives by their social connections 
should not claim rights only for themselves. National segregation is not better than racial 
segregation.
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